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From a subsistence economy, remote from the mainstreams of trade, the 
Niger Delta communities moved to a position in the forefront of the trans-
Atlantic trade and became vital to European economic interests in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These communities were offered, and they 
seized, new opportunities for acquiring wealth, power and prominence, 
heralding their rise from isolation and obscurity. During the era of the slave 
trade they made wealth from the trade acting as middlemen between the 
hinterland slave producers and coast-based European traders. They also 
accumulated wealth from the palm oil trade following the abolition of the 
slave trade. However, these communities whose elites enjoyed profound 
prosperity, power and prominence subsequently declined in grandeur. This 
paper locates the roots of contemporary poverty and violence in the Niger 
Delta communities in the vortex of European imperialism, which suppressed 
the growth of a viable class of indigenous accumulators and entrepreneurs in 
the palm oil economy. It demonstrated that contemporary trends and 
phenomena only heightened when the crude oil economy penetrated and 
reconfigured Niger Delta communities.  
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Introduction 
The Niger Delta is the pivotal point where all of Nigeria’s plagues of political 
gangsterism, corruption, violence and poverty converge. The violence of the 
Delta is a reaction to a long history of exploitation, the presence of 
transnational corporations, a style of politics where violence is often 
encouraged and supported by politicians, and the sheer welter of groups, 
gangs, and cults without a leadership (Kashi, 2008: 25-27). The Niger Delta 
has grown into a hugely complex enigma with abysmal underdevelopment in 
the midst of plenty (Naanen, 2004: 4). Okey Ibeanu (2003: 16-36) captures it 
as the paradox of plenty, the paradox of national security and the paradox of 
development, while Amnesty International (June 2009: 9) reports that the 
poverty of the Niger Delta, and its contrast with the wealth generated by oil, 
has become one of the world’s starkest and most disturbing examples of the 
“resource curse”.  
Massive poverty exists in the Niger Delta and opens no other reasonable 
outlet to human agency to search for justice than resort to violence. New 
forms of violence and security firms, private armies, multiplying arms 
dealers and markets in arms are spreading in the Niger Delta unregulated. 
Small arms have become the weapons of mass destruction in the Niger Delta, 
fuelled by the prevalence of poverty. Poverty is the destruction of human 
well-being through the lack of access, entitlement and capacity to command 
basic well-being (food, clothing, shelter) or capability deprivation (Ofor, 
2005: 1; Sen, 1995: 11-24). 
This discourse is located in the ‘interactive resource control theory of 
material inequality generation’ (Tilly, 2007: 56-7), which contends (i) that 
material inequality results from unequal control over value-producing 
resources; (ii) that an inequality-generating mechanism of exploitation occurs 
when persons who control a resource enlist the effort of others in the 
production of value by means of that resource but exclude the others from the 
full value added by their effort. Exclusion most emphatically and directly 
produces poverty. The United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (UK DFID, 2005: 5) asserts that social exclusion matters 
because it denies some people the same rights and opportunities that are 
afforded to others in their society.  
Primitive accumulation under capitalism took place through conquest of trade 
routes, colonial taxation, etc., and accumulations by way of a market system 
of “unequal exchange” whose exact mechanisms have changed over time but 
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which have involved basically the “exchange of quasi-equivalents, behind 
which was hidden the exchange of a smaller for a larger quantity of labour” 
(Cliffe, 1976: 114). Colonialism generated new forces and social relations of 
production yet did not completely destroy pre-colonial social forces and 
modes of production but simultaneously articulated them. The colonial-state 
encouraged foreign merchant companies and their domestic agents to open 
up and expand the market economy while subjugating indigenous 
competitors (FGN, 1987: 37). But the advent of the post-colonial state, with a 
colonial praxis, witnessed the ascendance of an overarching national 
ideology that consolidated the impoverishment the Niger Delta communities. 
Naanen (2001) rightly argued that the resources of the Niger Delta were 
expropriated, first, by the British Crown by right of conquest, symbolized by 
imperialism and colonialism, then, passed on to the successor Nigerian-state. 
Indigenous Accumulation in the Beginning: From Subsistence Economy 
to Slave Trade           
The Niger Delta communities transited from farming villages to fishing 
villages to trading-states, (Horton, 1969; Alagoa, 1970) became central to the 
economic interests of Europe (Anene, 1966) and back to fishing villages 
(Nwabughuogu, 1982). At the second level, they transited from the slave 
trade to the palm oil trade to the crude oil economy. In the subsistence 
economy, trade developed almost inevitably between areas with different 
products: the salt and dried fish of the coastal and salt water delta were 
exchanged for the agricultural produce of the hinterland and freshwater delta 
(Alagoa, 1970: 323; Ejituwu, 1991: 52). 
The competition between villages for fishing grounds often issued in wars 
with attendant atmosphere of insecurity and the Delta communities’ obvious 
need to augment their manpower to pursue their commercial relations with 
the mainland would warrant the recruitment of new members to increase the 
fighting force through the purchase of domestic slaves from the Igbo 
hinterland. Europeans only grafted the incentives of the internal long-
distance trade like capital, institutions, trade routes and relations with 
producing communities and markets into the emergent trans-Atlantic trade 
(Alagoa, 1971: 272; Cookey, 1974: 18).  
With profits from the trade Niger Delta middlemen began to buy slaves for 
sale and also for incorporation into their own households (Horton, 1969: 46). 
Consequently, the middleman, the link between the interior natives and the 
Europeans at the coast, became a significant factor in the Euro-African trade 
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relation and many delta communities and individuals within them grew 
wealthy. The “trust” system became the pivot of the Delta trade 
(Nwabughuogu, 1982: 365; Jones, 1989: 28-30). The Atlantic trade, which 
began in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, (Ryder, 1965: 215-236), 
launched Niger Delta’s incorporation into the capitalist world-economy with 
the growth of capitalist social relations in Western Europe from the sixteenth 
century. Albeit with two profound economic implications: firstly, it 
stimulated internal production; secondly, it facilitated indigenous 
accumulation. This was particularly so during the period of “legitimate 
commerce” (the palm oil economy), and less so during the slave trade era 
since the procurement of slaves involved little productive activities (Hopkins, 
1973: 124; Naanen, 1987: 51; Zeleza, 1993: 372). 
Palm Oil Trade and Indigenous Accumulation 
The palm oil trade originally was part of the slave trade and had encouraged 
the rise of a relatively small group of ‘large entrepreneurs’ in the Niger Delta 
(Hopkins, 1973: 124; Northrup, 1978: 227; Latham, 1986: 268). The change 
from slaves to palm oil witnessed an increase of middlemen, attendant 
competition and rivalries as each trading state redefined the limits of its 
trading monopoly and boundaries of its new commercial empire (Jones, 
1989: 66-7; Wariboko, 153). It marked the beginning of the emergence of a 
viable merchant class in the Niger Delta who were determined to improve 
their own profit prospects and expand their export trade portfolio. African 
traders like King Eyo of Old Calabar attempted to ship their commodities 
direct to Europe when he chartered an entire vessel in 1857 to ship their 
commodities to England (Dike, 1956: 122). But the Liverpool merchants, 
conscious of the imminent danger that would confront their export monopoly 
and profit margins, with the backing of the British consular power under the 
authority of Consul Hutchinson, would frustrate this attempt and forced King 
Eyo to sign an undertaking never to contemplate shipping oil directly to 
England. 
From the late 1860s, primitive accumulation by Niger Delta middlemen 
entered a phase when a generation of highly resourceful entrepreneur-rulers 
began to use their power to monopolize trade in their domains for the 
possibility of a transformation of the relations of production and ownership 
of property. In the 1880s, this class of indigenous accumulators led another 
African initiative to break the European export monopoly and established 
themselves as exporters independent of the European firms.  
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Nana and Jaja, Nigeria’s first modern capitalists and commercial strategists, 
had commercial organizations stretching over considerable areas of the Niger 
Delta and employed several thousand people in various capacities, which no 
European firm, even if prepared to employ Kru labour on a vast scale, could 
have done the same (Gertzel, 1962: 363-5; Naanen, 1987: 53; Rotimi & 
Ogen, 2008: 48). In 1884, when eight British commercial firms who became 
apprehensive of Jaja’s enormous profit-making ability at their expense, came 
together, except Alexander Miller, and unilaterally fixed the price of produce, 
Jaja retaliated by breaking into the export trade, hitherto an exclusive 
preserve of the European firms, and succeeded in shipping his palm oil to 
Birmingham, thereby becoming the first Nigerian direct exporter of palm oil 
and pioneered Nigeria’s indigenous produce export trade (Gertzel, 1962: 
361-6; Pedler, 1974: 76; Rotimi & Ogen, 2008: 51-2).      
In 1883, Jaja made a contract with a Birmingham hardware firm to buy his 
manillas (trade currency) direct from them at the then high prices of palm oil, 
for the following three years, and obtained a higher price for his produce 
while paying less for his manilas (Gertzel, 1962: 365). Consequently, Jaja 
took produce away from them and left them with stocks of trade goods 
unsold. 
However, the commercial ambition of this generation of African 
accumulators coincided with the scramble and partition of Africa, the classic 
response to the crisis of the capitalist world-economy in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. Internal accumulation conflicted with the basic social 
aims of European imperialism. Immanuel Wallerstein (1974: 66-131) argued 
that the metropolitan bourgeoisie saw the strong states of the periphery as 
competitors and feared that the local bourgeoisie might use the state 
structures to check the scale of metropolitan accumulation. If the 
international division of labour existent in the palm oil economy that offered 
Niger Delta communities profound indigenous accumulation was allowed to 
expand, these communities would have consolidated the evolving capitalist 
class structure since they were clearly in the process of modernizing 
independently of European rule (Crowder, 1968: 119). 
European Mercantile Imperialism and the Crisis of Indigenous 
Accumulation 
In the late 1880s, British naval power was used to enforce the will of the 
European traders on African coastal rulers and middlemen in the Niger Delta. 
This phenomenon ‘bred in the womb of monopoly capitalism’ (Zeleza, 1993: 
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371) led to the brutal deportation and crushing of the emerging indigenous 
capitalist class in the Niger Delta. Gertzel (1962: 365) observed that by 
removing Jaja and Nana, the British administration was removing the only 
Delta Africans who had the resources to attempt an African export trade. 
However, Jaja and Nana only represented the emergent commercial 
entrepreneurs and capitalist class in the Niger Delta. 
The beginning of British Consular rule with the appointment of John 
Beecroft in 1849 entrenched European traders’ authority in the Niger Delta 
and guaranteed the conditions conducive for foreign capital suppression of a 
viable class of indigenous capitalists (Naanen, 1987: 54). Niger Delta’s 
indigenous accumulation crisis became aggravated with the amalgamation of 
all British firms operating on the Niger into the United African Company in 
1879 by George Taubman Goldie, the standard bearer of British imperialism 
vis-a-vis foreign capital in Nigeria and the monopolist of the trade of the 
Niger (Flint, 1960: 30-33).  
In 1886, the UAC became known as the Royal Niger Company with the 
award of a British royal charter. While produce prices were depressed, prices 
of the company’s staple imports were increased. The RNC’s monopoly 
capitalism and economic strangulation through the complete commercial 
blockade of Brassmen caused so much impoverishment so that part of the 
population went into smuggling while others resorted to fishing to make up 
for the lost revenue from trade. Consequently, whole communities and towns 
which had prospered from trade were impoverished by the RNC’s 
mercantocracy (Flint, 1960: 198; Nwabughuogu, 1982: 370-2; Naanen, 1987: 
54-55; Wariboko, 2007: 33). The RNC’s tool of customs duties on the Niger 
Delta merchants from whom trade has been snatched was completely 
devastating. Yet the Foreign Office considered it as the only source of 
revenue for the expenses of the administration. Any infringement on custom 
duties in the company’s frontiers would attract seizure and confiscation of the 
canoe and its contents (Wariboko, 2007: 23).    
The Era of British Colonial Capitalism 
Colonial subordination from 1900 succeeded in perfecting mechanisms of 
surplus extraction without altering the material basis of production. British 
state support for the exploitation of the Niger Delta by metropolitan merchant 
capital in the era of colonial imperialism led to the impoverishment of the 
accumulating indigenous petty-bourgeoisie. The penetration of the hinterland 
by both British government and commercial enterprises meant the 
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progressive decay of the coast towns which had seen centuries of great 
prosperity (Anene, 1966: 325).  
The founding of Port Harcourt in 1912 as the main terminal port on the Delta 
and the construction of the Eastern Railway line from Port Harcourt to Enugu 
between 1913 and 1916 meant that the ocean gateway of Eastern Nigerian 
foreign trade had literally moved 40 miles inland. From 1917, there increased 
entry of foreign merchandise with attendant profound evacuation of raw 
materials from the Eastern Nigerian market through Port Harcourt rendered 
the older Delta ports of Bonny, Brass, New Calabar, Okrika, Opobo, etc, 
commercially impotent and caused massive poverty (Nwabughuogu, 1982: 
370-1; Ofonagoro, 1979: 213; Anyanwu, 1979: 21-23). 
The expatriate firms established trading depots along the lines in the stations, 
and new branch factories outside, thereby liquidating what had hitherto 
remained a preserve of the middlemen. Trading centres were established 
along the lines from whence produce is railed to Port Harcourt for shipment. 
These expatriate firms also established small buying stations where produce 
is purchased direct from the producer and transported by motor lorry to the 
trading centres on the railway. Since their spheres of trade were swallowed 
up by the expatriate firms, the Niger Delta middlemen were being eliminated 
from any effective role both in the import and export trades simultaneously. 
In 1917, when the Port Harcourt harbour was opened to international trade, 
all commercial establishments in Bonny were closed down: the African Oil 
Merchants was closed down; the African Traders Company was removed; the 
beach belonging to the African Association was abandoned; the Marine 
Department was transferred from Bonny to Port Harcourt; the mail steamers 
no longer called at Bonny as the Customs Department was removed; and, the 
Cable Station was transferred to Port Harcourt. The worst affected, because 
the most isolated from the channels of trade in the new era, was the erstwhile 
port of Brass. In 1920, the total trade of Brass amounted to £20 in imports 
and £9,787 in exports (Anyanwu, 1979: 21-23). 
The official closure of the Brass port by the Government of Southern Nigeria 
to foreign shipping in 1921 led to the absence of business there between 1921 
and 1930 warranting many Brassmen and other Ijo men to move with their 
canoes to neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and 
Gabon, among others (Ebikoro, 2006). The undercutting of the middlemen by 
the firms which gave them trust made it difficult for many middlemen to 
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meet their obligations to the firms. Inexperience with a highly unstable 
export market made the middlemen believe that the high prices of good years 
would continue in the future. Therefore, lured by these optimistic 
expectations, they borrowed heavily to expand their merchandise portfolios 
and to get into debt when prices came down (Myint, 1980: 58). During this 
time, Opobo Division alone had no less than 100 debt cases. The ‘trust’ was 
not only an instrument of monopoly, but also a mechanism of dependence. 
British colonial currency policy (between 1900 and 1948) was also guilty of 
laying the foundation for contemporary poverty in the Niger Delta. Under 
colonialism, the continuing circulation of the traditional manilla currency 
was not conducive to the transfer of surplus from the colonial periphery to 
the metropolitan core. Therefore, a national currency, which could be linked 
to the sterling, was needed to promote trade and taxation. No localized 
currency would be retained and the sterling exchange was introduced (Myint, 
1980: 61; Naanen, 1993: 25-46). Given the substantial degree of wealth 
accumulated by the Niger Delta middlemen in manilla, switching over to the 
sterling without compensation for the existing stocks of manilla imposed 
significant losses on its holders. More so, profound quantities of it were 
diverted to ritual, prestige and ceremonial purposes by the accumulators 
rather than into investment outlets, even as there were no banks to facilitate 
savings and investments. 
The Post-Colonial Mode of Production in the Crude Oil Economy 
The Colonial Mineral Ordinance enacted by Lord Frederick Lugard shortly 
after the amalgamation in 1914 gave the monopoly of oil mineral exploration 
to Britain and vested the ownership rights in the crown. In 1937, the Colonial 
Mineral Ordinance gave Shell D’Arcy exclusive exploration and prospecting 
rights in Nigeria. In 1938, the Colonial Office granted an Oil Exploration 
License covering the whole country to Britain, while the Petroleum Profits 
Tax Ordinance of 1959 gave a 50-50 profit sharing arrangement between 
Nigeria and the oil multinational corporations leaving out the oil producing 
communities of the Niger Delta.  
By the mid-1960s, the collapse of world prices for cash crops allowed for the 
significant growth of petroleum exports from the Niger Delta. In 1969, 
Decree No. 51 vested in the Federal Government the entire ownership and 
control of all petroleum while the Federal Commissioner of Mines and Power 
(now Minister of Petroleum) possessed the sole power to grant Oil 
Exploration, Oil Prospecting and Oil Mining Leases to oil prospectors while 
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Offshore Revenue Decree No. 9 empowered the Federal Government to 
receive all offshore oil revenue from wells located in the coastal waters 
thereby cutting off the communities from any access to oil (Soremekun and 
Obi, 1993: 219-220; Obi, 2001: 25-6). 
In March 1978, the Federal Military Government promulgated the Land Use 
Decree (later Land Use Act) placing all lands in the trust of the state 
government. In 1993, General Babangida, promulgated Decree No. 52 
(Titles, Vesting, etc.) appropriating all lands within 100 metres of the 1967 
shoreline of Nigeria. Communities’ access to oil revenue allocation was 
blocked and ownership of oil-rich land was denied while the beneficiaries 
became the Nigerian-state and the Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs). 
Having lost the ownership rights of their land and without entitlements to any 
royalties, the communities could only demand inappropriate compensations 
from spillages or surface rents from the oil MNOCs. 
Crude oil production in the Niger Delta resulted in environmental 
degradation, destroyed rural livelihoods, aggravated poverty and reduced 
citizens to subjects (Ibeanu and Luckam, 2006: 36; Okonta, 2008: 153, 
Amnesty International, June 2009: 7). The failure of the Nigerian-state to 
respond meaningfully to the oil communities’ demands for full citizenship 
rights prepared the ground for the emergence of community grassroots 
(ethnic-based) social movements wherein the youth constitute the crack 
troops to secure some form of political, cultural, and economic autonomy. 
Such groups include: the Ijaw Youth Movement (IYC), Ikwerre Youth 
Movement, National Youth Council of Ogoni People, Niger Delta People’s 
Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), etc. 
Quintessential political entrepreneurs like Isaac Adaka Boro, Kenule Saro-
Wiwa, Alhaji Asari Dokubo, etc, would deploy a complex mix of communal, 
class, and civic sentiments to mobilize the masses against the fraudulent 
Nigerian-state. Ogoni exemplified the double-layered contradictions being 
spawned by the further integration of the Niger Delta into the global 
capitalist system as a source of cheap oil (Obi, 2001:29). 
Rapid transformations at the global and domestic environment levels would 
influence the bursting forth of the hitherto suppressed grievances of Niger 
Delta communities against deprivation, exclusion, marginalization, 
alienation, impoverishment and environmental degradation (Saro-Wiwa 
(1992: 7). Attendant state repression caused the migration of hundreds of 
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Ogonis to several countries to constitute either a diaspora community or 
refugees (Baah, 2006). 
The transition to democracy in 1999 and the subsequent militarization of 
politics corrupted these movements leading to the emergence of militia 
enclaves, private armies and cult groups in the Niger Delta and attendant 
complex dialectics that would challenge the raison d’ etre of the 
communities and the Nigerian-state. To extract legitimate or illegitimate 
shares of oil money, the youth would take over and occupy oil production 
facilities and take oil workers hostage (kidnapping for ransom). Oil 
bunkering (theft of crude oil), ab initio, like smuggling in the palm oil 
economy, a survival strategy, has become a major source of funds and a 
lucrative business, patronized and protected by highly placed citizens in the 
society. The stolen oil is sold in dollars (sometimes exchanged for arms and 
drugs) to foreign buyers whose vessels are always on the high seas (Pugh, et 
al, 2004: 1-15; Naanen, 2004: 4-9).  
The United States’ symposium in January 2002 on “African Oil and U. S. 
National Security”, organized by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and 
Political Studies (IASPS), recommended that the Gulf of Guinea be declared 
by Congress as an area of vital interest for the establishment of a regional 
sub-command in the area. Reminiscent of the nineteenth-century gun-boat 
diplomacy, in May 2004, the U. S. marines moved into the Gulf of Guinea 
(Naanen, 2004: 4-9). Yet, the incidence of bunkering and kidnapping is 
continuing unabated. 
Perhaps, it persists because hope is being extinguished by crass corruption in 
the Niger Delta, an incubator of corruption, a political weapon constantly 
polished to keep the masses in perpetual vulnerability. Presently, there are 
pronounced signals that politicians in the region are luring the boys and 
militant leaders out of the amnesty programme since the boys see a road out 
of a dysfunctional social landscape that offers rewards far in excess of what 
mainstream society can offer (NEXT editorial, 26 November 2009). Due to 
endemic corruption in the Niger Delta, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas 
Development Commission (OMPADEC) of the 1990s and the Niger Delta 
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Conclusion 
The evolution of contemporary pervasive poverty, violence, and criminality 
in the Niger Delta is tied to the elimination of its communities from the 
process of capital accumulation as middlemen in the palm oil economy. 
While expanded indigenous accumulation and the possible capitalist 
transformation of class structure was hindered by European imperialism, 
formal colonial subordination, more forcefully, checked capitalist 
development and fostered conditions conducive to foreign capital 
suppression of the growth of a competing and viable class of indigenous 
accumulators. Post-colonial Nigerian-state and the crude oil economy 
penetrated and reconfigured the Niger Delta communities by its despotic 
power, subverted socio-political development and deepened poverty, 
criminality and violence, occasioning the return of Western state actors to the 
Gulf of Guinea to secure their energy source. 
Mercantile and colonial capitalism caused the first wave of migrations from 
the Delta communities to other countries, while the dialectics of the crude oil 
economy caused the second. Kidnapping and bunkering can be rationalized 
as survival strategies (shadow economies) in a war economy operated by the 
Nigerian-state particularly in the Niger Delta. The agitations for resource 
control and self-determination later corrupted by the crude oil economy 
originated in the palm oil economy, while the trajectories of their evolution 
characterized by deviation from sound ideologies to an unparalleled 
criminalization were the result of PDP’s attempt to annihilate the opposition 
and capture political power at all cost.  
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